This paper finds remarkable heterogeneity in the relationship between legal traditions and finance in former colonies. The effect of the British common law on financial development is conditioned by the level of initial endowments. In former colonies with low precolonial population density the common law has promoted high financial development, but where endowments were abundant this legal tradition has not worked well. In contrast, the effect of the French civil law on finance is invariant to endowments.
INTRODUCTION
Many economists have stressed the pivotal role of the financial system in the process of economic development.
1 As a result, a growing number of studies have sought to explain why some countries have a well-functioning financial system and others do not. A very influential explanation is the law and finance theory, which emphasizes the role of legal institutions as an important engine of financial development. It is commonly believed that the British common law tends to support the protection of property rights of private investors vis-à-vis the state to a much larger extent than the French civil law, with positive ramifications on financial development. Another widely held theory focuses on the initial conditions existing in colonized territories. Factors such as disease environment, indigenous population density or resources abundance determined the colonial strategy of Western powers and shaped the incentives to create different types of institutions. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) relate the endowment theory to financial development by arguing that sound private property rights protection is key to financial contracting, which is a prerequisite for financial systems to develop.
2
The law and finance theory and the endowment theory are not mutually exclusive because they both explain in different ways the influence of colonialism on national legal systems and more particularly, on those institutions that enforce private property rights and contracts.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) provide empirical evidence that both theories matter for financial development. We go one step further by asking whether the effect of legal traditions on finance is conditioned or not by the level of endowments. It is relevant to study whether the British common law and the French civil law work better in some countries than in others depending on their initial endowments. In fact, Ross Levine (2005b, p. 84) poses the following question: "do the law and endowments interact?" Given that the French civil law is associated with worse institutions than the British common law, he suspects that the negative effect could be particularly large in territories with adverse endowments. To our surprise, these interesting questions have not yet been addressed in the literature.
This paper tries to fill this gap by testing the presence of heterogeneity in the interaction between legal traditions and endowments. Particularly, we expect the effect of the common law on finance to depend negatively on initial endowments, whereas the effect of the French civil law is expected to be constant irrespective of initial endowments. On the one hand, we argue that the common law works optimally when it is well implanted by European practitioners, as occurred in the settler colonies of North America and Australasia. In these sparsely populated places at the time of colonization, property rights and private contracts were enforced and financial markets could prosper. However, in large parts of its empire, Britain conducted a colonial policy known as "indirect rule" which did not intend to effectively introduce its legal system, particularly in territories politically organized or extensively occupied by native population, like Sub-Saharan Africa (Zweigert and Kötz 1998) . Rather, local rules were left almost intact and political and judicial powers were concentrated in the hands of traditional chiefs. This led to the control of economic resources by elites, with little incentive to protect property rights and enforce contracts, thus rendering underdeveloped financial systems. On the other hand, France conducted a very different colonial policy based on the ideal of legal and cultural assimilation and a centralized conception of its colonial empire, which was considered as an intrinsic part of the Republic (Fieldhouse 1966, Zweigert and Kötz 1998) . The result was the imposition of the Civil Code in a more rigid and uniform way, which led to a more homogeneous effect of the French civil law on legal and financial systems across colonized territories. This indicates that initial endowments play a different role in each legal tradition. The British common law produces worse outcomes in territories with larger endowments, whereas the French civil law leads to similar results irrespective of the level of endowments.
3 Table 1 (Panel A) provides some preliminary evidence on this issue. Rows present former colonies classified according to their legal traditions. The first two columns show the mean values of our main financial indicator (private credit over GDP) for colonies with population density in 1500 below and above the median. The third column reports the t-statistic of mean differences. For the full sample of colonies, those with greater precolonial population density have, on average, a level of private credit about 20 percent of GDP lower. The difference appears highly significant, which fits well with the endowment theory. Moreover, the last column shows that British common law countries exhibit higher financial development than French civil law countries, which is also consistent with the law and finance theory.
However, both patterns vanish when legal traditions interact with endowments. Interestingly, only common law countries fit well with the endowment theory, as given by significantly lower financial development for a level of endowments above the median. In contrast, French civil law countries exhibit a level of private credit largely independent of initial endowments.
These patterns are supported by Figure 1 that shows that endowments only play an important role in common law countries but do not in French civil law countries. Returning to Table 1, another remarkable observation can be made: the common law is not always associated with higher financial development, since civil law countries have a higher level of private credit (0.24 versus 0.17) for population density above the median.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here]
This study makes another contribution by providing evidence for the need to divide the wide group of colonies labeled as French civil law into three categories, according to the way the civil law was transmitted to the recipient country. The first category brings together colonies obtaining the French civil law by France itself. The second consists of the former Spanish colonies, while the third group comprises the remaining colonies. As detailed below, their historical experiences are very different and there are reasons to believe that the reception of the French civil law varies from one group to another. More specifically, the Spanish American colonies share the Castilian law legacy and the adoption of the Civil Code by imitation, aspects that facilitated the reception of the French civil law. Thus, we expect former Spanish colonies to have higher financial development than former French colonies.
In line with our predictions, This preliminary evidence is extended below with the estimation of cross-country regressions for a sample of 100 former colonies. An interaction model is proposed to explain financial development through legal traditions, endowments and their interaction. The analysis is formulated in terms of five main hypotheses and gives consistent support to our theory-based predictions: 1) the effect of the common law on financial development is influenced negatively by the level of initial endowments, 2) the effect of the French civil law on finance does not depend on initial endowments, 3) there is heterogeneity in the interaction between legal traditions and endowments, 4) the common law is not always related to higher financial development since the French civil law equals the common law when the level of endowments is sufficiently high, 4 and 5) there are significant differences within the French civil law tradition, in particular, former Spanish colonies are associated with more financial development than French colonies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the law and finance and the endowment theories. It also formulates some plausible hypotheses that result from interacting legal traditions with endowments and from categorizing French civil law countries into three groups. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and the data used. Section 4 presents the basic regression evidence as well as the results of extensive robustness checks.
Section 5 puts forward some implications and concludes.
THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS

Law and finance theory
The law and finance theory stems from the pioneering work of La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 , who trace the relationship among legal traditions, legal institutions and financial development. Beck and Levine (2005) decompose the law and finance theory into two broad propositions. First, financial development is promoted when legal institutions guarantee private property rights and enforce contractual arrangements. Second, countries' legal traditions can account for differences in current legal systems and financial development.
4 Throughout the analysis, when we talk about high levels of endowments we either refer to high precolonial population density (implying abundance of indigenous labor), high mineral resources abundance, land suitability for plantation crops or to high settler mortality. According to the endowment theory, a common feature to all endowments is that they are fundamental factors for explaining the colonial strategies followed by Western powers. High levels of endowments are generally associated with low European settlement and the prevalence of extractive institutions aimed to exploit the resources of the colonized territories.
Through conquest, colonization and imitation the British common law and the French civil law spread around the world. Both legal families exhibit different features, which can be traced back several hundred years to the British and French revolutions or even earlier (Klerman and Mahoney 2007, Glaeser and Shleifer 2002) . Unlike the French civil law, the common law is thought to be more respectful with private property rights and private contracts, to be less supportive of government regulation and to promote the independence of the judiciary (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) . Two mechanisms explain the superior performance of the British common law: the "political" and the "adaptability" channels. The first implies that legal traditions differ in the weight assigned to private property vs. the rights of the State, while the second focuses on judicial formalism and the ability for each tradition to evolve. The historical victory of the coalition among the English Parliament, bourgeoisie and judges against royalists in the English civil wars in the seventeenth century promoted the protection of private property rights. Moreover, the caselaw principle, based on the judicial precedent, provided Britain with a legal system that could easily adapt its law to changing circumstances (Beck and Levine 2005) . In contrast, in the French Revolution the principle of separation of powers relegated judges to a secondary role of mechanical application of the law, while the state's powers were strengthened. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003b) provide an empirical evaluation of these two mechanisms, finding evidence more supportive of the "adaptability channel". Merryman (1996) states that despite the emphasis made on the principle of separation of powers and the subordination of judges to the legislator in the French revolutionary period, soon after the situation would be relaxed and French courts would be granted the power to interpret laws. However, "when the French exported their system [to their colonies] they did not include the information [saying] that it really does not work that way" (p. 116), thus hindering the development of the judicial system in many developing countries.
When the law and finance theory is applied to former colonies, the massive transplant of legal systems by Western powers is considered to be an extraordinary historical event that has shaped and oriented the legal system of former colonies. European powers introduced statutes, codes, legal principles and court systems, thus determining the particular legal tradition transplanted to colonial dominions. Even nowadays, some authors find legal connections or "contemporary transplants" between origin countries like France and Britain and their former colonies (Spamann 2010) .
Endowment theory
Proponents of the endowment theory focus on the initial conditions (or endowments) in colonized territories, which influenced the type of political and economic institutions established by European powers. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) point out that factors such as indigenous population, mineral resources and land suitable for sugarcane crops led to the predominance of large scale-plantations and mining in the New World, which originated highly unequal societies with institutions biased to privilege the elite. In contrast, North
America was sparsely populated and lacked conditions for large plantations. This led to colonies of settlement where smallholder farmers of European descent established constitutional systems with a high degree of self-government that was conducive to subsequent economic development. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) argue that the economic profitability of alternative colonial policies and the suitability for European settlements are responsible for the colonial strategy followed. Hence, in those places where 5 Bruhn and Gallego (2012) also provide evidence of "reversal of fortunes" for a sample of 345 regions belonging to 17 American countries.
Interacting legal traditions with endowments
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) realize that the law and finance and the endowment theories are not mutually exclusive and provide evidence that both matter for financial development. We go one step further by asking whether the effect of legal traditions on finance is conditioned by the level of endowments.
Comparing the reception of French and British laws, Zweigert and Kötz (1998) 7 Glendon, Carozza, and Picker (2008) indicate that there was an extensive reception of the common law in territories characterized by the absence of "civilized" local law and the presence of only a small indigenous population. In their opinion, the civil law is easier to receive than the common law because of the "convenience of codes rather than a matrix of case law and statutes, the more complex language of the common law and the ability to accept a Roman based civil law which is private and [poses] little threat to a political system" (Glendon, Carozza, and Picker, p. 174) . In previous work, Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe (1985) point out that the proper functioning of the common law depends on the development of a body of judicial precedents, which is not easy to materialize. In this respect, Joireman (2004) states that the evolutionary nature of the common law is generally true in developed countries but it should not be assumed in poor countries. Kenya, for example, lacks an organized record of legal decisions, which is necessary for the application of the judicial precedent.
Whereas the French empire was highly centralized and directly ruled, Britain opted for a system of colonial administration with more flexibility, variability to local conditions and local autonomy, which in many parts of the empire took the form of indirect rule (Fieldhouse 1966) . 8 French centralism led to a more uniform application of the law across its empire, while the British showed clear variability in the way the common law was exported to colonial societies. Also, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) 8 The different colonial strategies between the British and the French are well reflected in their ratios of colonial officials to population in the 1930s. This ratio equaled 3,660:15,000,000 for French West Africa, which contrasts with the ratio 1,315:20,000,000 for Nigeria (Kirk-Greene 1980) . 9 A good account of the variability in the degree of application of the common law by the British to their colonial dominions is provided by Daniels, Trebilcock, and Carson (2011) . In Nigeria, where indirect rule was extensively exercised, there existed two parallel courts: colonial courts applicable only to matters involving Europeans and native courts that -under indigenous customs and rules-dealt with all disputes between non-Europeans, who under certain conditions could also appeal to the British court. This dual court system implied that the common law hardly applied to the great majority of the indigenous population. In addition, since native chiefs were granted extensive executive powers by the British, and, unlike precolonial times, were no longer subject to check and balances by the native population, they undermined the historical legitimacy of the native court system as well as the effectiveness of their customary law. Unlike indirectly ruled areas in Africa, India was administered as a "direct/indirect rule hybrid" and managed to gradually adapt the colonial legal system to the needs of the Indian population, which resulted in the creation of "a court hierarchy and a body of law that was both effective and accepted by the native population" (p. 135).
10 Comparing the direct and indirect rule systems within India, Iyer (2010) finds that areas under direct rule experience significantly lower levels of schooling, health provision and roads in addition to worse poverty and infant mortality outcomes in the postcolonial period. A key to understanding why in this case indirect rule led to better outcomes lays in the fact that hereditary kings had incentives to properly govern Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003a, b) argue that the way European laws were transplanted to the colonies is key to explaining the quality of legal systems. Receptive or successful transplants are those that adapt the imported law to local conditions or when the population is familiar with law principles. Under these conditions, countries are able to develop extensive and effective legal institutions. The transplant of the British common law to the colonies was receptive mostly in the settler colonies, and unreceptive in the extractive colonies, as in sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the rigid implantation of the French civil law in French colonies led to widespread unreceptive transplants, irrespective of initial endowments. This suggests that the effect of initial endowments on the effectiveness of legal systems varies across legal traditions.
The whole picture indicates that there were different patterns of transplantation of European laws to the colonies. The implantation of the French civil law appeared to be more rigid and mechanical, conducted uniformly across all colonies and was more ambitious, since the final objective was legal assimilation. As a result of this homogeneity in the exportation of the law, one would expect the relationship between the civil law and finance to be largely invariant to endowments across former French colonies. By contrast, the implantation of the British common law was not uniform across former colonies. In those places with a lower level of endowments the common law was extensively implanted and fitted well with the colonial their "native states", since they could be removed in the event of misrule. In the case of British India, it is important to distinguish the type of land revenue system in place. Iyer finds that a cultivator-based land revenue system, where the ruler is in charge of collecting the revenue directly from cultivators, produced superior public goods outcomes than a landlord-based revenue system, wherein the revenue collection is carried out by landlords. These results appear in line with those of a previous study by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) that did not include those areas in India under indirect rule. Interestingly, the good performance of the indirect rule exercised by hereditary kings in the native states contrasts with that of the indirect rule applied by landlords in British India, who -unlike the former-were not subject to removal in the case of misrule. Therefore, Iyer's overall results are not that different from those obtained for indirectly ruled areas in Africa. Whenever the incentives faced by the local administrator are not appropriate, indirect rule can lead to poor institutional governance, with negative repercussions on postcolonial development.
society, which led to the development of legal institutions promoting financial markets. In places with larger endowments where indirect rule generally prevailed, "extractive colonies"
were established and the superficial application of the British law barely influenced and even distorted previous legal practices based on customary law.
The previous discussion allows us to draw a set of hypotheses, which will be tested in the empirical section. Regarding the common law tradition, our prediction is reflected in the following 
Differentiating colonies within the French civil law tradition
Within the group of former colonies belonging to the French civil law tradition there are countries of very diverse origin. We argue for the need to distinguish among at least three categories on the basis of the way the French law was obtained. (Zweigert and Kötz 1998 , Garro 1992 , Mirrow 2004 .
The second feature shared by former Spanish American colonies is the specific way of importation of the French civil law. Since these territories achieved their independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they were free to choose and build by themselves their legal systems. Thus, they received the French civil law by imitation, that is, through voluntary transplant, which increases the chances of receptivity by allowing the adaptation of foreign law to local conditions (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003a) . The civil codes of Chile and Argentina are good examples of adaptation to national circumstances, and many countries in the region took them as models (Mirrow 2001, Zweigert and Kötz 1998) . In contrast, as noted by Merryman (1996) , colonies receiving the French Civil Code directly by
France itself did so more rigidly and did not receive the blueprints of how courts could interpret the law rather than simply apply it -as held by the Napoleonic doctrine. This led to inefficient outcomes and expectedly hindered the development of the judicial system and in turn inhibited financial development in former French colonies (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003b Finally, with respect to the third group within the French legal tradition, i.e., the group 'others', we do not make specific predictions because this residual group comprises former colonies occupied by different colonial powers and we lack an appropriate theory for the way each of these powers transplanted the civil law to their colonial dominions. However, we can at least suggest that since they belong to the civil law tradition, they share features with the other civil law countries and, therefore, we expect a similar behavior.
justify the creation of the 'Spanish law legacy' category. The use of years since independence as a discriminating factor among civil law countries supports our classification, since 17 of the 19 colonies that became independent before 1850 were Spanish. Furthermore, although there is variability within Spanish American legal systems, differences with respect to the other French civil law groups are higher. Thus, we observe more homogeneity within the 'Spanish law legacy' group than in the whole group of civil law countries. For example, the Spanish law group presents a coefficient of variation for the indicator "creditor rights aggregate score" (from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) of 0.80, lower than the value for the whole civil law group (1.02) and that for civil law countries not belonging to the Spanish law tradition (1.14). Regarding the ratio of private credit to GDP, the Spanish law group presents the highest level of homogeneity, as reflected in the lowest coefficient of variation 0.57 versus 0.76 for the whole civil law group and 0.85 for civil law countries not belonging to the Spanish law tradition.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Empirical strategy
The general approach to assessing the role played by legal traditions and endowments has been the estimation of additive models Levine 2003a, Levine 2005b) . This type of model only allows for constant (linear) effects of legal origin on financial development, thus being unable to test the set of hypotheses formulated above.
Towards that end, we need an interaction model that allows for the possibility of heterogeneity in the coefficient on endowments such that:
Regarding hypothesis H3 that supports the heterogeneity in the interaction between legal traditions and endowments, it is tested by comparing the β2 and β3 coefficients. If both are significantly different, then H3 is accepted. Hypothesis H4 -concerning the relative effects on financial development of the common law vs. the civil law-can be tested by comparing the predicted values of financial development for both legal traditions at low and high levels of endowments.
Moreover, we argued above for the need to differentiate among three groups within the French civil law tradition on the basis of the way the civil law was received, namely, 'implantation by France', 'Spanish law legacy' and 'others'. This leads us to estimate a more complete model, which constitutes our reference specification: 
This model allows us to test hypothesis H5 by statistically comparing the coefficients on the variables corresponding to the 'implantation by France' and the 'Spanish law legacy' categories. We expect statistically significant differences between the β1 and β2 coefficients, but no significant differences between the β5 and β6 coefficients, as given by the similar response across both civil law groups with respect to endowments. We will also be able to check whether β1 is lower than β2, as implied by the more adverse effect of the civil law tradition on financial development when it is implanted by France itself relative to Spanish colonies.
Data
The sample is restricted to overseas former colonies of Western powers, which excludes for example Japanese colonialism and colonies within the European continent. The restriction to former colonies is due to two reasons. First, legal traditions are arguably exogenous only for colonized territories since European powers transplanted their legal systems irrespective of the will and the endogenous development of indigenous societies. In this sense, colonialism is seen as a kind of natural experiment to assess the impact of legal traditions (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003a) . Second, the endowment theory is applicable only to former colonies since what matters is the influence of initial conditions on the colonial strategies and policies implemented by colonizers. The resulting sample contains only countries within the British common law and French civil law traditions. There are a maximum of 100 excolonies for which data on our main indicators of financial development, legal traditions and endowments are available.
As a first concern, it is necessary to choose a proxy for financial development. Finance theory focuses on the role of financial institutions in channeling funds from savers to investors, gathering information and allocating capital to the highest-yield investment projects, exerting corporate control, pooling funds, managing risks and facilitating the exchange of goods and services, and how all these functions translate into a better allocation of resources and economic growth. Ideally, our measure of financial development should account for these functions provided by the financial system. However, there is little consensus on how to properly measure them. As noted by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , what the extant literature has done so far is to use some imperfect proxies that may miss many of the key aspects to a modern financial system. Among all the possible financial development proxies, our preferred measure is private credit by deposit money banks and other non-bank financial institutions over GDP, which we denote by private credit. Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) we also employ indicators of equity market development and private property rights protection. Stock market capitalization equals the total value of listed shares over GDP and is used because some economies rely more on financing directly through markets than via financial intermediaries. Protection of property rights is an indicator provided by the Heritage Foundation which measures the degree of protection of property rights by laws and the government, the possibility of expropriation, the independence of the judiciary and the enforcement of contracts. The law and finance and the endowment theories emphasize that legal traditions and endowments influence property rights and other elements of the legal environment, which are key to financial development.
Regarding the measure of endowments, our preferred choice is the logarithm of population density in 1500, which comes from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) (2000), Mahoney (2003) , Lange (2004) , Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau (2006) and Bruhn and Gallego (2012) .
REGRESSION RESULTS
Main regression results
20 Precolonial urbanization rate may be a better proxy for pre-existing wealth, but it implies a drastic reduction of the sample (for example, it does not include sub-Saharan Africa). Regarding potential settler mortality rate, there is controversy on the reliability of the data (Albouy 2012) and also entails a significant reduction in the sample. Moreover, after 1850 the widespread use of quinine meant that tropical diseases declined in importance as an obstacle to European settlements (Olsson 2009 ), which implies that settler mortality as an endowment indicator may be less appropriate for the imperialist wave of colonization.
Other variables such as geo-climatic conditions are rough indicators of endowments and do not reflect the level of precolonial development.
coefficients. In line with Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) , these preliminary results are consistent with the endowment and the law and finance theories.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Yet this is not the whole story. The results of the interaction model estimated in column 2 are appealing and give support to hypotheses H1 to H4. First, the interaction between the common law and population density is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
This is consistent with H1 that predicts that the effect of the common law on finance depends negatively on initial endowments. Second, the interaction between the civil law and population density is close to zero and highly insignificant, which clearly fits with H2, i.e., the civil law has a constant effect irrespective of the level of endowments. 22 The statistical significance of the coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law) when the log of population density is equal to 0.
23 The value for the common law is calculated as the constant -which measures the omitted group (i.e. the British common law)-plus the coefficient on the interaction between the common law and endowments statistically significant. Therefore, the evidence indicates that at high levels of endowments, French civil law countries at least equal the financial development level of common law countries.
24
Column 3 presents our reference model that divides the French civil law tradition into three groups. It is remarkable that hypotheses H1 to H4 are also largely satisfied in this case and hold for the three groups of French civil law tradition. 25 It remains to be shown whether hypothesis H5 is fulfilled. The dummy 'implantation by France' presents a larger negative coefficient (-0.42) than the dummy 'Spanish law legacy' (-0.20), the difference being statistically significant at the 1% level. Since the coefficients on the interaction terms for both civil law categories are not significantly different (p-value of 0.14), we can assume the differences reflected in the dummy variables to be largely invariant to the level of endowments. 26 Both findings account for the fact that the Spanish civil law tradition leads to higher financial development than when the civil law is implanted by France itself. Regarding the category 'others', it presents similar patterns to the Spanish law legacy group, with a times the log of population density. Likewise, the value for the civil law is calculated as 0.49-0.274+0.006*endow.
24 The relatively poorer performance of the common law at high levels of endowments can be related to the findings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , since they show that political institutions (instrumented by endowments -population density in 1500 and settler mortality-) are more critical to economic growth, investment, and financial development than contracting institutions (instrumented by legal origin). Hence, Acemoglu and Johnson's evidence suggests that endowments matter much more for financial development than having a common law tradition; and arguably, when large endowments are present the adverse effect on financial development dominates the positive effect from being a common law colony. Thus, it can be inferred that the common law by itself does not guarantee financial development.
25 Note that the marginally significant positive coefficient on the interaction term 'implantation by France x Pop. dens.' does not imply the rejection of H2, since it becomes insignificant once we introduce additional control variables. Regarding H4, we also point out that for a level of population density of 10, the predicted value of private credit for the 'implantation by France', 'Spanish law legacy' and 'others' groups equal 0.233, 0.288 and 0.262, which are larger than the predicted value for the common law group (0.16), though again the differences between the predicted value of each civil law group and that of the common law group are not statistically significant.
slightly larger negative coefficient on the dummy variable (-0.26) and an insignificant coefficient on the interaction term.
All other columns of Table 2 introduce additional factors that may affect financial development. We begin by including the logarithm of per capita GDP in column 4, which corrects for the possibility that cross-country differences in income could be driving financial susceptible to influencing finance is ethnolinguistic fractionalization, which is included in column 7. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine argue that greater fractionalization is related to policies and institutions intended to maintain the political and economic power instead of creating a competitive financial system. In the last three columns, we introduce latitude, the percentage of land in tropics and regional (continental) dummies. This will allow us to discard the possibility that the results are due simply to a correlation between financial development and colonies concentrated in areas with particular geographic features. Table 2 offers a consistent pattern indicating the robustness of our baseline results. In general, we find significantly negative coefficients on the civil law dummies, and the dummy 'implantation by France' appears with a larger negative coefficient than the other civil law categories. In addition, the interaction term 'common law x pop. dens.' always exhibits a highly significant negative coefficient, whereas the coefficients on the interaction terms for the civil law groups are never negative and in most cases are insignificant and close to zero.
Overall, these results appear in line with those obtained in the specification with no controls, which imply that the five hypotheses formulated in Section 2 are largely satisfied.
27
Regarding the control variables, per capita income, years since independence and latitude are positively correlated with private credit, whereas the Africa dummy presents an expected negative sign. Finally, Tables 3 and 4 use stock market capitalization and protection of property rights as dependent variables. Remarkably, in both cases we find the same patterns in the estimated coefficients as in the specification for private credit, though the evidence supportive of hypotheses H3 and H5 is less clear-cut for the case of property rights protection when the civil law tradition is disaggregated into three groups.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here]
Sensitivity Analyses
In the previous tables we have controlled for a number of alternative factors in order to ensure that our results are not affected by omitted variable bias. However, other problems may still persist. In this subsection we apply extensive tests to control for political structure 27 The statistical difference between former French and Spanish colonies -as implied by H5-disappears when controlling for geographic regions, years since independence and per capita income. The fact that the Latin America and Caribbean dummy overlaps with former Spanish American colonies drives the difference between both civil law categories insignificant. Something similar occurs due to the high correlation between years since independence and Spanish law legacy, because all the Spanish American colonies included in our analysis achieved their independence early in the nineteenth century (between 1811 and 1825). Finally, the endogeneity of per capita income may spuriously reduce the coefficient on the independent variables, as argued in La Porta et al. (1999) . This is what we observe for the coefficient on 'implantation by France' that almost halves and becomes close in size to that on the 'Spanish law legacy' group.
variables, alternative indicators of endowments, sample selection and outliers. Table 5 reports the results from these robustness checks for private credit.
The political environment is often seen as a potential determinant of finance. Groups in power use their influence to shape policies and institutions to their own benefit (North 1990 ).
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) argue that economic institutions derive from political power, which is the combination of political institutions and "de facto" political power. Beck and Levine (2005) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) make reference to a number of studies that challenge the explanatory power of legal origins using political arguments. Our aim is to test whether our findings remain unchanged after controlling for differences in the political structure of countries, since centralized and powerful governments are more likely to be conditioned by the elite than competitive political systems (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2001b) . Columns 1 to 3 introduce three political variables: 'legislative competition', 'checks' and 'executive constraints'. The first two are also employed by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) with the same purpose.
'Legislative competition' captures the degree of competition of the last legislative election and 'checks' measures the number of influential veto players in legislative and executive initiatives. 'Executive constraints' measures the "checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process" (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010, p. 24) . In the three cases, the results remain robust and only the indicator 'checks' appears correlated with private credit.
28
28 Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003a) , we also estimated these regressions through twostage least squares, using as instruments for political structure the religion variables, years since independence and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The political structure variables never appeared statistically significant whereas our previous results remained unchanged. Moreover, we regressed financial development indicators only on political structure variables, using as instruments our legal origins and endowments variables. Although political variables often exhibited significant coefficients, the overidentification tests were rejected, reflecting that our independent variables influence financial [Insert (2001) to account for the feasibility of settlements by Europeans.
According to the endowment theory we expect a negative relation between potential settler mortality and financial development. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) provide another indicator, the rate of precolonial urbanization, which is used as a proxy for precolonial wealth. Since precolonial prosperity gave the incentive to set up "extractive institutions" as a mechanism for extracting resources from colonial territories, we also expect a negative relationship between this variable and financial development (column 5).
Column 6 introduces the inverse of the "wheat/sugar ratio" that represents the suitability of land for sugarcane relative to wheat (Easterly 2007). Sugarcane was a widespread crop in plantation colonies, whereas wheat was not advantageous in large-scale cultivation. Column 7 employs an indicator of mineral resources endowments that calculates the average of mineral rents over GDP during the period 1960-2000. According to Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) , the plantation system and the exploitation of mineral resources in the New World led to highly unequal societies that favored institutions built to benefit elites. negatively related to finance only for the common law tradition, but not for civil law countries.
The influence of outliers is another usual problem in econometric analysis. We consider several statistical methods to identify outliers such as leverage, standardized residuals, Cook's distance and DFITS. 29 Once outliers are detected, we exclude these countries and rerun the regressions. Columns 8 to 10 clearly show that our findings remain unaltered when outliers are excluded. In the remaining columns, we verify that the results are not driven by specific regions or particular groups of countries. Column 11 removes the colonies known as neo-Europes (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), which are considered extreme cases of British colonialism, with initially low indigenous population density and currently highly developed financial systems. Column 12, 13 and 14 drop the regions Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and Africa, respectively. It is remarkable that our findings are highly robust to the presence of outliers as well as to the exclusion of several groups of countries.
30
29 The cut-offs of the detection methods are the following: leverage, 2·k/n; standardized residuals, |2|; Cook's distance, 4/n; DFITS,
; where k is the number of parameters and n is the number of observations. For outliers diagnostics and methods, see Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (2004) .
30 Fairly similar results follow from these sensitivity analyses when the dependent variable is either stock market capitalization or protection of property rights, though for the latter the evidence supportive of hypotheses H3 and H5 is less clear-cut. For reasons of space, these results are not reported but are available as unpublished appendices from the authors upon request. For similar reasons, we do not report the results from the following robustness checks to alternative classifications of civil law countries. First, we disaggregated the residual group 'others' at the highest possible level, resulting in five new subcategories: British colonies (6 countries), Portuguese colonies (5), Belgian colonies (3), Dutch colonies (2) and others (one Italian and one US colonies). The results for the common law and for the categories 'implantation by France' and 'Spanish law legacy' remain unchanged. Regarding the other civil law subcategories, Portuguese colonies often report a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term, which does not fit with what we observe for the other civil law groups. Second, to be sure that our findings are not driven by the residual group, we redo the analysis without the 18 countries belonging to that group. The results remain remarkably robust with this reduced sample. Third, we use years since independence rather than the colonizing country as a discriminating factor among civil law countries. We can distinguish two well-differentiated groups: those countries enjoying more than 150 years of independence and the rest. Using these two categories, we find the same pattern of heterogeneity in the 5. CONCLUSIONS This paper extends the law and finance theory by demonstrating heterogeneity in the interaction between legal traditions and endowments. We find that the effect of the common law on finance is conditioned by the level of endowments. Thus, for common law countries a negative relation between endowments and financial development is consistently observed.
When one turns to civil law countries, the picture is quite different. We find that the impact of the civil law on finance does not depend on the level of endowments. This heterogeneity leads us to an interesting result in the relative effect of legal traditions: at low levels of endowments the common law is associated with higher financial development, but as the level of endowments rises, the difference between the British and French legal traditions shrinks and becomes statistically insignificant. In that case, the prediction by the law and finance theory that the common law tradition leads always to higher financial development than the French civil law tradition does no longer hold. Also, it is interesting to note that the endowment theory only fits with the group of common law colonies.
The different patterns of implantation of European legal systems in colonial territories are key to understanding the results. According to Zweigert and Kötz (1998) , Britain transplanted its legal system in a heterogeneous way across its empire. Some territories received the British common law extensively (e.g., settler colonies) and developed the legal requirements for well-functioning financial markets. In other territories with large endowments the implantation of the British law was very superficial and the system of colonial administration known as indirect rule prevailed. This led to the concentration of power in the hands of interaction between legal traditions and endowments. Also, the civil law group of early independence (with 90 percent of former Spanish colonies) is associated with more financial development than that gaining independence later. traditional chiefs and to ineffective legal systems, with negative consequences for the development of financial markets. In contrast, France pursued legal assimilation throughout the empire and its colonial legal policies were set accordingly (Zweigert and Kötz). The French empire was more centralized than the British, and colonial dominions were considered as an intrinsic part of the Republic (Fieldhouse 1966). These particularities led to a more rigid and uniform application of the law across the empire, which can largely account for the fact that the impact of the French civil law on finance does not depend on initial endowments.
We make another contribution to the law and finance literature by arguing strongly in favor of distinguishing former Spanish colonies from the other civil law countries. We do so for a couple of reasons: 1) they share the legacy of the Spanish law tradition, which facilitated the reception of the Civil Code, and 2) all the Spanish American colonies imported the Civil Code by a common procedure, namely, imitation. The evidence supports our argument since former Spanish colonies show a higher level of financial development than those territories where the civil law was implanted by France itself. The effect of the Spanish law legacy is also independent of the level of initial endowments, which can be explained because Spain also applied Castilian laws uniformly across its American colonial possessions and all the American colonies adopted the Civil Code through voluntary transplant (Garro 1992 , González 1992 .
Although this paper focuses on historical events, the consequences of the processes set in motion in the distant past continue to persist today. Those territories where European legal systems were not adapted to local circumstances or were hardly implanted deserve maximal attention from a policy perspective. Also, it is interesting to analyze the possible advantages of certain regions sharing the same legal influence. In this sense, the more rigid implementation of the civil law in French colonies, although negative in some aspects, can provide some advantages. For example, since 1993 sixteen countries in the francophone SubSaharan Africa adopted uniform commercial and financial legislation within the framework of the OHADA, 31 which is a useful policy tool to promote trade, financial integration and economic growth. These developments in regional integration and other topics related to legal traditions are fields of great interest for researchers. • Spanish law legacy
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Latin America and Caribbean Africa a For low levels of endowments, this hypothesis is tested for a value of population density equal to 1 (log=0). In this case the statistical significance of the coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law). • Others x Pop. dens. • Implantation by France x Pop. dens.
Common law = Civil law a For low levels of endowments, this hypothesis is tested for a value of population density equal to 1 (log=0). In this case the statistical significance of the coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law).
NOTES: Dependent variable is stock market capitalization, which represents the total value of listed shares over GDP. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A. The sample contains non-European countries colonized by Western powers (Appendix B). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. In the bottom part of the table we show the p-values of the Wald tests of equality of coefficients. PD means population density.
Common law = Imp. by France Common law = Spanish law leg. • Others a For low levels of endowments, this hypothesis is tested for a value of population density equal to 1 (log=0). In this case the statistical significance of the coefficient on the civil law dummy reflects whether the civil law group is statistically different from the reference group (the common law).
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